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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock 
 
Putin and the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs 
With parliamentary elections on the horizon, and in view of his quasi-alliance with 
big business, President Vladimir Putin's stance on deregulation and reform of the 
Russian economy has become more cautious. In order to avoid financial and 
economic turbulence that could erode his support among powerful lobbyists and 
the populace, he will not halt the deregulation and reform; however, the process 
will not continue as before. A case in point is the current controversy over the 
deregulation of the electrical sector, notably Anatoly Chubais' United Energy 
Systems (UES). (THE RUSSIA JOURNAL, 17 Jan 03; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
Putin has made an arrangement with the powerful group of businessmen known 
as the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE) that in essence 
has delineated separate sectors of influence. As Igor Vurgens of the RUIE 
explains, "the agreement stipulates that we do not interfere with politics. Our area 
is economy. On the other hand, the president does not influence the competitive 
economic fight." (KONSERVATOR, 20 Dec 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) RUIE serves as the contact point between the Kremlin and big 
business. It has maintained a fairly consistent lobby vis-à-vis the Kremlin to 
encourage reform and deregulation. In May of 2002, members of its board met 
with Putin and pushed a reformist agenda concerning the Central Bank and 
currency turnover. (VREMYA MN, 25 May 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) In effect, Putin is allowing the tycoons a chance to extend their 
financial freedom and economic influence. 
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In some areas, the government's policies are not aligned fully with the RUIE, but 
business influence is apparent. Reform programs in the energy sector have been 
on the government's agenda for some time now, with UES at the forefront. Ideas 
advocated by Anatoly Chubais include a breakup of UES into smaller 
corporations. The large corporations within the RUIE do not see this as a 
favorable development. The plan has been debated in the Duma for some 
months now, as the Kremlin seeks a compromise that would allow for 
restructuring to take place without alienating commercial interests that stand to 
lose a good deal of money. 
 
Some papers have noted that the coming elections also may have motivated the 
Kremlin's deceleration of reforms. The administration has voiced no denial. In 
fact, the Kremlin Chief of Staff, Alexander Voloshin, said in December that "the 
quality of reform is no less important to us than its pace," a catchphrase that 
means a considerable shift toward a slower rate of reform. 
 
This combination of imperatives, from both the elections and the lobbyists, has 
taken a toll on Putin's approach toward oversized industries such as the electrical 
sector. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 18 Dec 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
Recently a Duma vote on UES's reform effectively was prevented, because of 
what is widely seen as lack of support by the administration. The bill will remain 
in legislative stasis until a more convenient time politically. (THE MOSCOW 
TIMES, 24 Dec 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
SECURITY SERVICES 
Another job well done? 
In what appears to be an annual event, leaders of the FSB gathered with senior 
editors of the Russian media to reflect on the many "successes" of the security 
service during the previous year. From Kaliningrad to points east, reports 
extolling the triumphs of the agency flooded the Russian media, including such 
FSB victories as the seizure of a paltry 1.5 kilograms of unspecified drugs, along 
 3 
with 10 kilograms of marijuana that reportedly were destined for Kaliningrad. 
(FINANCIAL TIMES, 19 Dec 02; via Lexis-Nexis) The FSB directorate for 
Kaliningrad also announced proudly that it had denied 27 foreigners access to 
Russia for such offenses as "collecting information about the socio-political and 
economic situation in the region" and "attempting to gain access to classified 
military facilities." 
 
Still, 2002's end-of-year report from Kaliningrad is less impressive than the 
"successes" celebrated by FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev at a similar 
FSB/media lovefest in December of 2001. In contrast to the petty drug busts and 
"capture" of those pesky information seekers of 2002, Patrushev in the previous 
year cited 43 special operations in Chechnya, the killing of 1,500 guerrilla 
fighters, and the closure of 76 rebel bases, just to name a few. (THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 16 Jan 02) Thinly shrouded by the pomp and circumstance of these 
recent announcements, the tragic events of the October 2002 Moscow theater 
incident that left 129 hostages dead remained conspicuously absent from the 
headlines.  
 
During his 2002 address, Patrushev had skillfully sidestepped the controversy 
surrounding the questionable apprehension and sentencing of Russian Navy 
journalist Grigory Pasko. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 16 Jan 02) The Pasko case 
dates back to November of 1997, when the journalist was detained by the FSB at 
a Vladivostok airport for carrying papers which the FSB alleged contained state 
secrets. In fact, the information was readily available in the public domain. 
Following an extended period of legal wrangling, including acquittals, Pasko 
ultimately was sentenced to four years in prison; he rejected an immediate offer 
of amnesty, refusing to admit guilt. Following his indictment Pasko was sent to 
the Ussuriisk hard labor camp, which is run by the justice ministry. (AGENCY 
WPS, 16 Jan 02; via Lexis-Nexis) 
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Now eligible for parole, Pasko has sparked further controversy. Key figures at the 
heart of this newest scandal are Alexei Simonov (chairman of the Glasnost 
Defense Foundation) and Russian Justice Minister Yuri Chaika. Chaika 
reportedly stated that Pasko had "refused early release," a claim that Simonov 
immediately characterized as "simply a lie, a public lie." In a judicious response, 
Deputy Justice Minister Yuri Kalinin attempted to cover Chaika's tracks by stating 
that his superior had been misinformed. (AGENCY WPS, 16 Jan 02; via Lexis-
Nexis) 
 
Simonov has asked President Vladimir Putin to help obtain the journalist's 
release on parole, in the face of comments from the justice ministry that Pasko's 
refusal to admit guilt could hinder his release, although an admission of guilt is 
not officially required for parole. "Parole is a result of the manifestation of state 
will. If you say that there is such a will, Pasko could be relieved from his unfair 
and undeserved punishment," Simonov's request reads. The foundation is not 
alone in seeking the president's support. The general director of the Russian 
PEN Center also has written to Putin with a similar request. "The Ussuriisk 
penitentiary facility, under pressure from certain forces that we believe convicted 
Pasko illegally, is preventing him from exercising his right for parole," said 
Alexander Tkachenko's telegram. (INTERFAX, 1204 GMT, 14 Jan 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-0114, via World News Connection) The administration of the 
penitentiary holding the journalist is scheduled to forward a recommendation 
about his parole to court this month. 
 
As the Pasko saga continues, actions of the justice ministry and FSB remain 
difficult (if not impossible) to anticipate. However, a degree of media scrutiny 
leads his lawyer to believe that the journalist's chances for parole are promising. 
(ASSOCIATED PRESS WORLDSTREAM, 16 Jan 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
FSB to be replaced by...science?  
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As if the increased attention commanded by the Pasko case were not enough, 
the FSB now may face a new competitor in providing security for Moscow and 
other large Russian cities. FSB Director Patrushev appears to have 
acknowledged as much in a foreword to a recently published book titled 
"Terrorism in a Megapolis: Assessing Threats and Safety." In an excerpt from the 
foreword (and acknowledgement of the obvious) Patrushev states, "The fight 
against terrorism is not a monopoly of the special services and law enforcement 
agencies. It is a matter of concern for the whole civil society, and all bodies of 
state power and administration." (ITAR-TASS, 1432 GMT, 15 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-
2003-0115, via World News Connection) The system described in the book was 
developed by a group of Russian scientists who recommend a "comprehensive, 
systematic" approach to countering terrorism in large cities. One would hope that 
any additional introduction of "science" into the FSB playbook would employ 
significantly more research than had been conducted prior to the heavily 
"scientific" approach used by the security services during the Moscow theater 
raid of October 2002. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Scott Fleeher 
 
Dangerous games 
The Russian campaign to supply nuclear technology to the world's "rogue 
nations" took two steps forward last month, as Moscow continues its attempts to 
revive influence amongst the former Soviet Union's allies, especially those whose 
relations with the United States currently are strained. This is not only dangerous 
to the United States and its allies, but potentially also to Russia herself. If any 
state has been exposed to the proliferation of conventional arms, it has been 
Russia-as far back as Afghanistan and currently in Chechnya, Russian 
servicemen have been killed by Russian arms. 
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SYRIA 
On 14 January, the Russian foreign ministry announced that Moscow had agreed 
to build a nuclear reactor to power a desalination evaporator facility and provide 
electricity to Syria, where it is not uncommon to receive four hours of electricity a 
day. According to the statement, "Syria is showing great interest in [Russian] 
high-technology achievements, research programs and projects and in setting up 
joint ventures and establishing direct contacts between research centers" in the 
two countries. (INTERFAX, 1439 GMT, 15 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0115, via 
World News Connection) The communiqué coincided with the arrival of Syrian 
Vice President Abd-al-Halim Khaddam in Moscow to begin talks aimed at raising 
the profile of the Russo-Syrian relationship, which has been lower in recent 
years.  
 
The Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) initially confirmed that discussions were 
ongoing, while stressing that an agreement was "not ready." Minatom later 
partially recanted this assessment by stating that the foreign ministry had made 
"several mistakes." (THE FINANCIAL TIMES, 16 Jan 03; via Lexis-Nexis) 
Regardless of which version is correct, clearly Russia has not ruled out the 
possibility of providing Syria with nuclear technology, although the Syrian 
government is internationally recognized as a violator of human rights and a 
sponsor of terrorist organizations (some of which appear to be unfriendly to 
Moscow). In this context, it should be noted that Putin has just cut back the list of 
nuclear technologies and equipment that had been banned for export until now. 
 
According to statements made by Khaddam and President Putin, at their joint 
press conference, it is only natural that Russia should share advanced 
technology, including military hardware, with Syria because such dealings had 
been the basis of their relationship during the Cold War. Putin stated that 
Russian experts have specific plans for launching large-scale projects with Syria, 
including in the military-technical sphere. Such cooperation, he said, has "always 
played a large role in relations between the two countries." (ITAR-TASS, 1205 
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GMT, 15 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0115, via World News Connection) Khaddam 
concurred, stating that "the time has come for Russo-Syrian relations to resume 
the right course." (ITAR-TASS, 1121 GMT, 15 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0115, via 
World News Connection) It should be recalled that Syria still owes about $10 
billion for weapons received during the Soviet era, although there has been talk 
of Russia writing off much of that debt for a new arms deal. 
 
Despite all of the statements, however, it is unclear how much was accomplished 
during Khaddam's visit in terms of cementing a specific deal (in contrast to 
Putin's December visits to China and India). For example, Russian Foreign 
Minister Igor Ivanov denied that the talks focused on the sale of the Igla missile 
system to Damascus. (ITAR-TASS, 1510 GMT, 15 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0115, via World News Connection) One possible stumbling block to specific 
deals, including nuclear projects and military equipment, is the aforementioned 
Syrian debt (although Moscow has chosen to ignore similar debts owed by other 
Soviet-era allies). Khaddam did mention that the debt issue had been discussed 
in Moscow and was now in the resolution phase, but Russian officials did not 
echo these words. (ITAR-TASS, 1409 GMT, 16 Jan 03; via Lexis-Nexis)  
 
Rather, a good portion of the discussions focused on coordinating policy 
concerning American efforts to disarm Iraq. As might be expected, Russia and 
Syria announced that they had agreed on a joint posture, particularly in the UN 
Security Council. (INTERFAX, 1427 GMT, 15 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0115, via 
World News Connection) 
 
IRAN 
On 25 December, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Aleksandr Rumyantsev and 
Iranian Vice President (and head of the Atomic Energy Organization) 
Gholamreza Aqazadeh signed a protocol -- prepared in Moscow last summer -- 
in which Russia agreed to speed up the construction of the Bushehr nuclear 
power plant and Iran agreed to consider building a second power generation unit 
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there. In addition, the document regulates the supply of nuclear fuel for the first 
power generation unit at Bushehr for part of 2003. Iran and Russia also signed a 
separate agreement stipulating the supply of fuel for Bushehr by Russia over the 
next 10 years. (ITAR-TASS, 1235 GMT, 25 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1225, via 
World News Connection) It will be recalled that the Gore-Chernomyrdin 
Agreement, unilaterally abrogated by Moscow, committed Russia to refrain from 
transfer of nuclear know-how to Iran. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
Combat pay due for working in the office? 
Media Minister Mikhail Lesin had little sympathy for journalists who find 
themselves on the wrong end of a fist. In an interview with Rossiyskaya gazeta, 
Lesin said he would not provide special protection to media representatives; 
attacks against them are, apparently, an occupational hazard. "[O]ur fellow 
journalists are beaten up not only in Russia - this happens everywhere. In our 
country aggression against journalists happens more often because they are 
always present where events are most heated," the media minister said, clearly 
missing the irony that many attacks occur in newspaper offices which journalists 
would have a difficult time avoiding. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 26 Dec 02; FBIS-
SOV-2002-1226, via World News Connection) 
 
Lesin seems to imply that most violence against journalists occurs in the line of 
duty; however, a recent report from the Glasnost Defense Foundation hints that 
the journalists are most often targets rather than merely hapless victims. 
Nineteen journalists died of "unnatural causes" in Russia in 2002, according to 
Boris Timoshenko of the foundation. "Speaking about these statistics, we do not 
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mean intentional murders. However, in many cases the circumstances 
surrounding the journalists' deaths look very strange, and in some cases their 
deaths were preceded by threats and pressure," Timoshenko said. Last year's 
statistics put 2002 above the average for journalists' deaths per year. The 
foundation's website reports that 148 journalists have died since 1992. 
(INTERFAX, 1147 GMT, 14 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0114, via World News 
Connection) No mention was made of suspicious but non-fatal attacks on 
journalists and newspaper offices. 
 
REGIONS 
Baby, it's cold inside 
Thousands of individuals have spent recent frigid Russian winter nights without 
heat, thanks in large part to faulty pipelines, according to the emergencies 
ministry. The combination of wear and tear on heating supply pipelines and 
extreme weather conditions made for a dangerous situation in many regions 
across Russia. Over 23,000 persons and 20 administrative complexes in eight 
communities in the republics of Karelia and Komi and the Leningrad and 
Novgorod regions were without heat at the beginning of January. The ministry 
reported that similar problems were experienced in Kaliningrad region, as well as 
in the Volga, Urals and Far Eastern districts. Nor were city dwellers exempt: Cold 
weather damaged heating lines in St. Petersburg as well. And, although 
Moscow's pipes have not been affected, 272 persons have died from the cold in 
the capital, while over 2,100 have sought medical treatment for hypothermia in 
the past four months. (INTERFAX, 1038 GMT, 9 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0109, 
via World News Connection) 
 
President Putin met with some of the regional governors to discuss the heating 
crisis, but offered no federal band-aid. Speaking with Sakhalin Governor Igor 
Farkhutdinov and Karelian Prime Minister Sergei Katanandov, Putin placed the 
responsibility for dealing with the crisis squarely on the shoulders of municipal 
authorities. Still, in a subsequent meeting, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov 
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promised that the cavalry would come to the rescue: The Leningrad and Far 
Eastern Military Districts will provide fuel for those regions. (ITAR-TASS, 1936 
GMT, 8 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0108, via World News Connection)  
 
The heating crisis fired up at least one MP, Lyubov Sliska, who wants the officials 
responsible to be punished severely. The current practice, of charging a fine 
equivalent to 200 minimum salaries, is insufficient, she said; higher fines, and 
possible jail terms, should be considered. (ITAR-TASS, 1143 GMT, 14 Jan 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0114, via World News Connection) 
 
To be sure, the crisis was not entirely due to obsolete pipes. In fact, the 
prosecutor's office in Karelia has opened eight criminal cases related to heat 
supply cuts to schools and apartment blocks. Heads of local administrations and 
managers of local enterprises are being blamed for negligence and abuse of 
power. (ITAR-TASS, 1206 GMT, 14 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0114, via World 
News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Steve Kwast 
 
State of the Armed Forces report focuses on reform 
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov submitted his end-of-year report on the 
state of Russia's armed forces, calling 2002 a year of progress toward 
sustainable development of the forces. While Ivanov certainly trumpets the 
military's successes, the report is unique in the frank discussion (by Russian 
standards) of the military's difficulties. Problems noted in the report range from 
outdated equipment to training, crime and social problems as well as high rates 
of suicide. (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 Dec 02; BBC Monitoring, via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
 11 
Stressing the changing world situation, the report specifically mentions the new 
Russia-NATO Council and how the developing cooperation will enhance global 
security and stability and promote what Ivanov calls "the correct understanding of 
the Russian Federation's position by the world community." However, Ivanov 
also emphasizes that the threats faced by Russia have not been reduced but 
simply changed. "The actions of radical Islamic forces in the North Caucasus and 
...of international Islamic groupings ...pose a special danger for Russia," the 
report says, linking (not surprisingly) international terrorism to the need for 
Russia's actions in Chechnya. Ivanov uses these circumstances to call for 
continued reform of the military, more emphasis on counter-terrorism and, of 
course, increased funding. 
 
For his part, Ivanov, while not totally forthcoming about all of the military's serious 
deficiencies, does acknowledge some of the more significant and growing 
problems: "...The situation remains difficult. Today, we still haven't overcome the 
most urgent social-housing problem and the continuing rapid obsolescence of 
weapons, military equipment and materiel, and the inadequate provision of 
combat and mobilization readiness and troop training is present. You know very 
well the causes of the state of affairs that has developed. And if we are unable to 
fundamentally change the situation in the near future, then Russia will have 
nothing with which to resist new challenges and military threats."  
 
Under a section labeled "Challenges," Ivanov lists what he sees as the three 
most pressing problems: First is the qualitative state of weapons and military 
equipment. It is no secret that much of Russia's military equipment and weaponry 
is becoming outdated and/or unusable. The limited military budget has prevented 
the purchase of badly needed new ships, aircraft and other weapons. Because of 
this, Russia's arms producers have focused their attention on customers 
elsewhere. According to the report, the answer to this problem is daily 
coordination and monitoring of the military-industrial complex's activities and 
linkage with the military's requirements. The question here is: Who will be in 
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charge of monitoring? The second most urgent challenge is the conversion to 
contract, or volunteer, military personnel. The lack of funding and support for 
adequate care, housing, meals and especially pay for contract forces has, to 
date, failed to attract the needed personnel and made this program largely a 
failure. No doubt that the bloody fighting in Chechnya also plays a part. The last 
of the three urgent concerns is the widely publicized lack of housing for troops 
and their families. Even with the construction and housing certificate programs 
that have been instituted, close to 168,000 servicemen do not have adequate 
living arrangements. 
 
The extremely poor treatment of servicemembers, which really should be 
Ivanov's top concern, is given credible recognition in the report. Even with prior 
pay and benefit increases, the report states, "a radical improvement of 
servicemen's living conditions and the enhancement of the prestige of military 
service still have not taken place." Ivanov does not ignore the inevitable results of 
the hardships suffered by Russian servicemembers -- crime and suicide. Citing 
numerous statistics that show significant reductions in all types of illegal activity 
committed by servicemen, the report still admits that "crime remains at 
impermissibly high levels in formations and military units of the North Caucasus, 
Siberian and Leningrad military districts, in the Northern and Pacific fleets, and in 
the Airborne Troops."  
 
In an interesting departure from the relative honesty of the report, evasion of 
military service is called the greatest proportion of all crime at 30%. Later in the 
report Ivanov states, "Crimes associated with servicemen's infringements on the 
lives, health, honour and dignity of their fellow servicemen persistently occupy 
one of the leading places in the overall structure of crime." Nowhere are crimes 
against servicemen linked to the high rate of draft evasion. The final concern 
expressed by Ivanov is the rate of suicide among military servicemen. At 27% of 
all deaths, suicide is the leading cause of death in the Russian military. The 
report does not address the roots of this problem. 
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Other difficulties also plague Russia's military, according to the report. Russia's 
defenses against terrorists, Ivanov says, "have not been completely worked out." 
The many military facilities holding nuclear and chemical stocks should be of 
special concern to the Russian government. The lack of training for air defense 
units is also noted, as is the inability of different forces and branches to operate 
together. Pilot flight time is another training area where reductions have been 
noted. 
 
Military reform: generals and politicians are part of the problem 
Last year's developments concerning military reform reveals some strong points 
for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov on this 
topic. Several of their initiatives show an awareness of the need to attack the root 
cause of current military dysfunction. However, a lack of concurrence of this 
vision by senior military officers and a lack of legislative support by the Duma 
have resulted in an overall failing grade for the year. 
 
The fundamentals of an effective military are to train, organize, equip and 
motivate the troops to carry out the mission. President Putin and Defense 
Minister Ivanov seem to understand this axiom by virtue of the initiatives they 
instigated. For example, last year's improvements in organization and training 
initiated by Putin and Ivanov resulted in an increase in the combat capability of 
Russian ground troops. The commander in chief of Russia's ground troops, 
Russian Deputy Defense Minister Col.-Gen. Nikolay Kormiltsev, outlined the 
success in a recent interview: "The organizational and methodological help 
provided by the high command to commanders had improved the quality of 
exercises and training. Before the high command was set up, each directorate 
chief solved problems in the Ground Troops' interests independently. There was 
no unified command or profound consideration for the troops as a whole. With 
the establishment of the high command, objectives are being accomplished in an 
integrated way and are subordinated to the overall goal: ensuring the troops' 
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combat and mobilization readiness." (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Nov 02; via 
Lexis-Nexis) 
 
In addition to organizational and training initiatives, Putin directed major cuts in 
forces to make more effective use of the limited funds available for military 
reform. Russia now has only 1.1 million soldiers, sailors and airmen in the armed 
forces under the Ministry of Defense, not including those in a dozen other 
agencies such as the border guards, the interior ministry and the railways. This 
contrasts with the 2.8 million-strong Soviet Red Army that the country inherited 
10 years ago. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 18 Dec 02) Other initiatives highlight 
the attempt to cut forces this year. According to Defense Minister Ivanov, "from 1 
January 2003 the structure of the headquarters will be optimized." He went on to 
say that the military administrative overhead must be cut in half to bring it in line 
with proportional management practices. (ITAR-TASS, 1141 GMT, 20 Nov 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-1120, via World News Connection) 
 
Putin and Ivanov also are targeting the low morale of the armed forces. 
"Improving the material circumstances of the corps and raising their pay is one of 
the main areas of Russian army reform. In addition, upon their return from 
contract service, service personnel must [be enabled to enter] into any civilian 
university, even a prestigious one," Ivanov said. (ITAR-TASS, 1144 GMT, 21 Nov 
02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1121, via World News Connection) 
 
These organizational, training and motivational initiatives, along with the increase 
in defense spending, all march the military in the right direction. But at each turn 
senior military officers and Duma deputies who are comfortable with the status 
quo resist change. One example is the military reform experiment taking place 
with the 76th Airborne Division. As soon as the experiment in Pskov started, 
Russia's top general, Chief of Staff Anatoly V. Kvashnin, cut its $85 million 
budget by 25% and withdrew an initial offer to provide apartments for new 
recruits. The situation became so bad that over 40 of the new volunteers walked 
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out in protest, which sent the all-volunteer experiment into an irrecoverable 
tailspin. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 18 Dec 02) 
 
It's not just the general officers like Kvashnin who don't fully support Moscow's 
vision of reform. Junior officers continue to use brutality and terror as 
motivational and disciplinary tools. Such practice is inconsistent with any type of 
volunteer service consisting of professional soldiers. On 5 January, 24 Russian 
soldiers deserted their post because of continual abuses they suffered from 
officers in their unit. (INTERFAX, 0716 GMT, 5 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0105, 
via World News Connection) This is just one of thousands of cases last year 
alone. These desertions highlight the disconnect between Putin's vision of reform 
and the officers' implementation of that vision. Defense Minister Ivanov identified 
the problem in a recent press conference: "A reason for mounting desertions 
from army units is the poor work of commanders. All these desertions have one 
thing in common, that is that ...commanders do not wish to perform their duties." 
(ITAR-TASS, 1830 GMT, 5 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0105, via World New 
Connection) Ivanov hit the mark. There can be no reform unless the leadership 
down through the organization (the commanders) understand, agree with and 
support the vision and mission. This is not the case in the Russian military.  
 
In addition to military officers standing in the way, the legislature is not doing 
enough to support reform with the necessary laws. For example, when the actual 
law raising soldiers' pay finally was drawn up by the Duma, the advantage gained 
by the increases was nullified by the elimination of other military benefits. The 
end result was the Duma saving face with a good public relations bill as money 
was shifted from military benefits to military pay. Another glaring example is the 
Duma's handling of the urgent need for increased military police in the armed 
forces. That initiative, which carries a large price tag, has been gathering dust in 
the State Duma for five years now. (VREMYA, Internet Text, 24 Dec 02; FBIS-
SOV-2002-1231, via World News Connection) 
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Politicians and officers digging in their heels on reform make an already bad 
situation worse, especially concerning troop morale. One symptom of that low 
morale is the rampant drug use in the Russian military. According to Maj.-Gen. 
Aleksandr Arutyunyan, the deputy military prosecutor, "The spread of drug 
addiction poses a threat to the combat ability of the Russian armed forces." As 
many as 287 criminal cases and 400 servicemen, including officers, have been 
processed over the last three years with many of them also involved in illegal 
arms sales. (INTERFAX, 23 Oct 02; via Lexis-Nexis) 
 
The end result of this year's initiatives by President Putin and Defense Minister 
Ivanov has been failure. Until they can get the Duma and the senior military 
officers on board, their initiatives will be derailed in the execution. This fight must 
be won at the top in the hearts and minds of those who carry out the president's 
will. Only then will the culture begin to change. Only then will the money be 
properly targeted to bring about real change. Unless that leadership changes, 
next year will be the same. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Miriam Lanskoy and Scott Fleeher 
 
UKRAINE 
To be or not to be Ukrainian 
Preliminary results of the first post-Soviet census taken in Ukraine were 
announced on 6 January 2003, just over a year after the census had been held. 
The census of 5-14 December 2001 showed an overall drop in the population to 
48,457,000 persons, in contrast to the 51,450,000 residents counted in the 1989 
census. (UNIAN, 2 Jan 03; BBC Monitoring, via Lexis-Nexis) Full figures will be 
published later in 2003. In addition to the population decrease, the census 
showed some fairly major demographic changes, such as a noticeable aging of 
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the population. Most attention, however, has been paid to data referring to ethnic 
and national identity. 
 
Individuals identifying themselves as Ukrainian constitute the largest share of the 
population (77.8%); the next largest group, Russians, amounts to 17.3% of the 
population. This marks a significant change in the balance of ethnicity, with a 
26.6% decrease in the Russian share when compared to the 1989 census 
results. (UNIAN, 2 Jan 03; BBC Monitoring, via Lexis-Nexis) The development 
certainly is due in part to the fact that the last census was taken when Ukraine 
was still a part of the Soviet Union. During the Soviet era, there had been a 
steady decrease in the number of self-declared Ukrainians, through falsification 
by the Soviet authorities in the census results, as well as false answers supplied 
by Ukrainians in the belief that a Russian nationality would allow them special 
privileges.  
 
In earlier censuses, the nationality was set at birth, based on the father's ethnicity 
and regardless of personal affiliation or where one lived. In the post-Soviet years, 
the role of national identity has undergone a substantial change, from an internal 
classification to an affiliation with a country with national symbols and a state 
language. It seems understandable, then, that there would be a marked increase 
among Ukrainians in the affiliation to Ukraine. While the breakup of the Soviet 
Union saw many demographic shifts in the populations of its former republics, it 
is not the case that Russians necessarily moved to what was now Russia: A 
large Russian minority population remains in many of the post-Soviet republics, 
including Ukraine. 
 
One of the most important aspects of the debate that has erupted over the new 
official ethnic balance is language. The status of the Russian language in 
Ukraine has been an issue for a long time; many Ukrainians fear that the Russian 
language easily could be strengthened vis-à-vis Ukrainian. The discrepancy 
between ethnic affiliation and language becomes apparent from the figures: Only 
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67.5% of the population cited Ukrainian as their native language, and 29.6% 
Russian. While this still constitutes a decrease for the Russian language, it is 
less stark than the delineation via ethnic identity. However, it is also likely that the 
number of persons actually speaking Russian in daily life is far greater than these 
numbers imply, especially in regions where Russian is the predominant language 
such as the Eastern oblasts and Crimea (where there are more Russians than 
ethnic Ukrainians). Oleksandr Mayborada, an ethnic relations professor at the 
National Academy of Science, commented that "While people may consider 
Ukrainian their native language, it doesn't mean that they use it. [...] Ukrainian 
may be their native language, but Russian is the language of communication." 
(KYIV POST, 10 Jan 03; via www.kyivpost.com) 
 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there has been an ongoing campaign 
for Russian to become Ukraine's second official language, with a particular focus 
on the use of Russian in classrooms. As recently as December 2002, Federation 
Council Speaker Sergei Mironov complained vehemently about the 
discontinuation of Russian-language instruction at Ukrainian universities, linking 
the issue moreover to use of Russian in all CIS countries as "common heritage." 
(ITAR-TASS, 6 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1206, via World News Connection)  
 
Language use is one of the markers that show very clearly the divide between 
the western and eastern regions of Ukraine. The debate also highlights that there 
is still some way to go along the way toward a firm national identity to be 
accepted by the Ukrainian population on the whole. Olexy Haran, a professor 
and director of the School for Policy Analysis at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, stated 
that "There is a belief that the Ukrainian language is spreading. But in a country 
where only one-quarter of the newspapers and magazines are published in 
Ukrainian, the figure is not unusually large. It does show that we are not 
experiencing a radical Ukrainization." (KYIV POST, 10 Jan 03; via 
www.kyivpost.com) 
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The data have led to an outcry on the part of the Russian population that results 
were falsified in order to undermine its role in Ukraine. Similar accusations are to 
be heard from the Ukrainian nationalist camp, which charges that the figures of 
Russians and Russian-speakers have been artificially increased. The distrust 
towards these data, as well as their importance to the country, illustrate some of 
the struggles of a relatively new country with a large population in establishing its 
own national identity. In a similar vein, a poll recently was undertaken to establish 
the perceived national symbols of Ukraine. The results were in part predictable, 
in part surprising and cause for concern: While more respondents named the flag 
and the state emblem (10%), many also cited bread and wheat (8.5%) and, on a 
negative note, poverty and social vulnerability (7.5%). (ITAR-TASS, 14 Jan 03; 
FBIS-SOV-2003-0114, via World News Connection) 
 
BELARUS 
Back again 
After lengthy talks at the end of last year, a new OSCE mission reopened its 
offices in Minsk on 13 January. Foreign staff members of the mission are to 
begin their work on 3 February. The head of the new office has not yet been 
named. This appointment will be made in The Netherlands, which took over the 
OSCE chairmanship from Portugal at the change of the year. Belarusian 
approval of the appointment is one of its conditions. 
 
The mission had been closed down last year after the Belarus authorities refused 
visa extensions for mission employees. The uncooperative stance of the Belarus 
leadership in combination with its bad human rights record caused 14 European 
Union states, followed by the US and Norway, to issue an entry ban on 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka and 14 other Belarusian high officials. After talks 
between the OSCE and Belarus resumed in Vienna, an agreement was signed 
on 30 December outlining the mandate of the new OSCE mission in Minsk. 
Friction between the West and Belarus had been growing for some years. 
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Lukashenka alleged that the OSCE mission was interfering in the state's 
domestic affairs, particularly in the context of the 2001 presidential elections.  
 
OSCE spokesman Richard Murphy outlined the mandate of the new group: "The 
new office will assist the Belarusian government in further promoting institution 
building, in further consolidating the rule of law, and in developing relations with 
civil society in accordance with OSCE principles and commitments. [...] 
Secondly, it will assist the Belarusian government in its efforts in developing 
economic and environmental activities. And thirdly, it will monitor and report 
accurately on the above-mentioned objectives." (RFE/RL POLAND, BELARUS, 
AND UKRAINE REPORT, 14 Jan 03) 
 
As soon as the accord was signed, the Belarus authorities voiced the demand 
that -- since a return of the OSCE to Minsk was assured and proof of cooperation 
by Belarus had been established -- the travel ban on President Lukashenka and 
the other officials should be lifted immediately. Belarus Foreign Minister Mikhail 
Khvastou stated on 30 December that "We value relations with the EU as a 
whole and with each specific country that is a EU member, and would like them 
to have the same reciprocal attitude toward us," adding that Belarus also wished 
to reopen a dialogue with the United States. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 3 Jan 03) 
Voices from the OSCE offices sounded more cautious, however, and the 
European countries and the US have not rushed to lift the ban. A US spokesman 
talked of "an important first step" and added that "real progress depends on 
cooperation on the ground that respects the role and mandate of the 
organization's mission." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 3 Jan 03; via Lexis-
Nexis) The new mission no doubt will be limited in its activities, but its progress 
and freedom surely will be watched closely by the international community. 
Monitoring of human rights and media freedom, two major areas, are not within 
the agreed realm of the mission's responsibilities, which has been one cause for 
concern. The question remains whether or when the US and European countries 
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will decide that the Belarus authorities have proved their willingness to cooperate 
enough to lift the travel ban.  
 
MOLDOVA 
Light at the start of the tunnel? 
The closing months of 2002 yielded little in terms of progress with regard to the 
removal of Russian troops and equipment from the disputed Transdniestr region 
of Moldova. In minor contrast, the opening days of 2003 provided mixed signals, 
along with a dim, yet nonetheless discernable, glimmer of movement. 
 
As faint as it may have been, the "glimmer" appeared in the form of 28 rail cars 
full of engineering and medical equipment that departed the region for Russia 
during the first few days of January 2003. (ITAR-TASS, 8 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-
2003-0108, via World News Connection) For those who consider the exodus of 
Russian troops and equipment from Moldova a positive event, this movement did 
in fact mark at least some minimal form of progress. However, the fact that the 
train was loaded with engineering and medical equipment (instead of ammunition 
and/or soldiers) indicates that what might appear to be a step in the right 
direction by Moscow may in reality represent the latest installment of 
procrastination in the resolution of the Transdniestr question. 
 
In stark contrast to the visible progress symbolized by a train leaving the station 
were the terse words of Deputy Commander in Chief Lieutenant General Valery 
Yevnevich. "Rumors about the withdrawal of our troops from there [Transdniestr] 
are groundless... As long as our group, including peacemakers from the joint 
forces, remains in the region, there will be law and order there," he said. (ITAR-
TASS, 10 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0110, via World News Connection) 
 
So the new year in Transdniestr is characterized by law and order maintained by 
"peacemakers" in an area known globally for its black market and illegal arms 
trade, along with the departure of a train full of the one set of items that likely 
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would have been welcomed if left behind. Seasons change...and OSCE 
agreements are amended...but some things remain just plain reliable.  
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
ARMENIA 
Kocharian visits Putin 
Armenian President Robert Kocharian met with Russia's President Vladimir Putin 
in the Kremlin on 17 January. Putin thanked Kocharian for "his attention to the 
needs of Russian servicemen" stationed in Armenia, particularly in view of the 
newly arrived soldiers from one of the bases still occupied by Russia in Georgia 
in violation of international agreements. (CHANNEL ONE TV, 1800 GMT, 17 Jan 
03; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
Kocharian claimed that Russian-Armenian military cooperation proceeds on the 
basis of the CIS Collective Security Agreement and is not a threat to third 
countries, such as Azerbaijan. (ARMINFO, 1550 GMT, 17 Jan 03; BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Kocharian also stressed that Russia is "the state with which we have the closest 
and most capacious relations," and which also has the biggest Armenian 
diaspora. Kocharian repeatedly emphasized his preference for secondary 
education in the Russian language, which is still practiced in many Armenian 
schools. (ITAR-TASS, 1601 GMT, 17 Jan 03; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
'Southern' Azerbaijan on the agenda 
In anticipation of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami's visit to Baku in March, 
the Azeri press has raised the issue of the rights of ethnic Azeris in Iran 
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(estimated to be as high as 24-30 million, that is, more than three times the 
population of Azerbaijan). The main complaint raised by the Yeni Musavat 
newspaper is that there the Azeri language is forbidden in public life and is not a 
language of instruction, despite constitutional guarantees. Another long-term 
project has been to open an Azerbaijani consulate in Tabriz, where ethnic Azeris 
are compactly settled. The consulate was supposed to open in January but has 
not. The biggest complaint concerns Iran's detention since 12 December of 
"hundreds" of peaceful Azeri protesters. (YENI MUSAVAT, 13 Jan 03; BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
 
GEORGIA 
Russia violates embargo on Abkhazia 
For the first time in 10 years a train from the Russian city of Sochi arrived in 
Sukhumi, Abkhazia on 25 December 2002, breaking the CIS-mandated embargo 
of the secessionist republic. Despite Georgian protests, the train has been 
running regularly ever since. (PRIME-NEWS, 1212 GMT, 10 Jan 03; BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Officials of 
the Russian transportation ministry initially refused to discuss the matter with 
their Georgian counterparts and now are insisting that the train belongs to a 
private company. On 16 January, the Russian envoy for Abkhaz conflict 
settlement talks, First Deputy Foreign Minister Valeri Loshchinin, defended the 
resumption of rail traffic, claiming that economic ties can foster resolution of the 
conflict. (KAVKASIA-PRESS, 0920 GMT, 16 Jan 03; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
 
President Eduard Shevardnadze said that Georgia would raise the issue at the 
next discussion in the UN Security Council scheduled for 31 January and that 
Georgia may refuse to renew the mandate for the continuing presence of 
Russia's "peacekeeping" force which expired on 31 December 2002. (RUSTAVI-
2 TV, 1700 GMT, 13 Jan 03; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) Others in the government favored more immediate 
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measures. Merab Adeishvili, Georgia's transportation minister, told journalists of 
his readiness to cut communications and transport services to Russian military 
bases on Georgian territory. (PRIME-NEWS, 1212 GMT, 10 Jan 03; BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) According 
to a policy articulated by Georgian Foreign Minister Irakli Menagharishvili, the 
embargo against Abkhazia can be lifted in all directions on two conditions: that 
Abkhazia begins status talks with Georgia, and that ethnic Georgian refugees are 
returned safely to their homes in Abkhazia. (KAVKASIA-PRESS, 1339 GMT, 10 
Jan 03; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
Georgia's protests to Russian officials concerning the resumption of rail traffic 
and the mass distribution of Russian citizenship to the Abkhaz have yielded 
some limited results and Western attention. On 16 January, the Georgian press 
reported that the OSCE and NATO's Partnership for Peace had affirmed their 
readiness to finance the removal of Russian bases in Akhalkalaki and Batumi, 
assuming that Russia will fulfil its commitment to evacuate them. (PRIME-NEWS, 
1039 GMT, 16 Jan 03; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) The Abkhaz have agreed to resume negotiation on 
Abkhazia's status. The talks will be held in London this month with Georgia's 
Minister for Special Assignments Malkhaz Kakabadze and Abkhaz "Foreign 
Minister" Sergey Shamba. (KAVKASIA-PRESS, 1824 GMT, 17 Jan 03; BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) A Georgian 
parliament delegation headed by Speaker Nino Burjanadze is scheduled to visit 
Moscow 20-25 January to discuss the Abkhaz crisis and new allegations that 
Arab and Chechen militants produced ricin poison in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge. 
(KAVKASIA-PRESS, 1320 GMT, 14 Jan 03; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
Delimiting boundaries and reforming constitutions 
Stalin's National Delimitation Program left a legacy of contested territory that still 
haunts the Central Asian republics. The initial design of the delimitation plan 
created a reliance on Moscow as the mediator of regional conflict. The borders, 
logical only in light of their regionally destabilizing context, were porous and a 
tolerable technicality for individuals living in the border regions of a Soviet Union 
that did not restrict inter-republic travel. While the collapse of the Soviet Union 
has forced the republics to address the issue of contested boundaries and revisit 
the problematic delimitation of Soviet cartographers, the ever-present tension 
along the boundaries has been especially evident over the past few weeks. 
 
Since independence there have been numerous discussions on the issue of 
delimiting borders. The past year alone has seen the playing out of these 
politicized negotiations between China and Kyrgyzstan as well as between 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 22 May and 25 Sep 02, 
respectively) The past month, however, has seen riots over the Kyrgyz-Tajik 
border; closure of the Kazakh-Uzbek border; tensions along the Turkmen-Uzbek 
border; and death due to land mines along the Tajik-Uzbek border. 
 
THE KYRGYZ-TAJIK BORDER 
The most glaringly illogical designs of national borders inherited from Stalin can 
be found in the Ferghana Valley, where territories of one country are surrounded 
by that of another. The southwestern part of Kyrgyzstan, for example, 
encompasses "island" territories over which Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have 
administrative jurisdiction. This affects transportation. For example, the only way 
to get to Isfana, one of the westernmost points of Kyrgyzstan, is by traveling 
through Tajikistan. (Likewise, the only way to travel from the east to Batken, the 
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provincial capital of southwestern Kyrgyzstan, is to go through the Sokh "island" 
of Uzbekistan.)  
 
The Tajik enclave of Vorukh is one of the "islands" of Soviet construction. Home 
to around 40,000 ethnic Tajiks, Vorukh is separated from Tajikistan by 20 km of 
Kyrgyz land. In the spring of 2002, tensions arose as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
began erecting border posts on disputed land. (KABAR, 14 Jan 03; via 
www.times.kg) (A December 2002 Kyrgyz-Tajik commission identified 
approximately 21 square km of disputed territory between the two countries. 
(EURASIANET, 8 Jan 03; via www.eurasianet.org) On 3 January 2003, over 300 
Tajiks from the Isfara region of Tajikistan (the section north of Vorukh from which 
originates the only road that connects Vorukh to Tajikistan proper) destroyed a 
Kyrgyz border and customs posts. (ITAR-TASS, 1126 GMT, 4 Jan 03; FBIS-
SOV-2003-0104, via World News Connection) In retaliation, the next day 
approximately 100 Kyrgyz destroyed a Tajik border post. Both sides have agreed 
to negotiations eventually leading to a delimitation of the borders, (AZATTYK, 15 
Jan 03; via www.times.kg) but anything less than an open border disrupts trade 
and perplexes local populations who do not see the need for the new border 
posts. And while the borders between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan became less 
porous with the 1999 invasion of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), 
(THE NIS OBSERVED, 10 Jul 02) the border issue has been unresolved for over 
10 years, leading locals to interpret (albeit fluidly) and subsequently accept 
(albeit possessively) borders of local and unofficial construction. 
 
THE KAZAKH-UZBEK BORDER 
Despite substantial progress in the delimitation of the Kazakh-Uzbek border, 
(THE NIS OBSERVED, 25 Sep 02) Uzbekistan moved to close its border with 
Kazakhstan at the beginning of the new year. According to Nurmat Otabekov of 
the Uzbek Ministry of Health, the reasons for the closure were to prohibit the 
spread of infectious disease and "stop low-quality food from entering 
Uzbekistan." The more realistic reasons for the border closing, however, were to 
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stop smuggling and the outflow of money from Uzbekistan (along the border, 
there is a thriving black market currency exchange of the Uzbek Sum), and an 
attempt to boost the domestic economy by encouraging production of local 
consumer goods that are otherwise purchased in Kazakhstan. (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, 12 Jan 03) The result, though, is a disruption of trade and an 
increase in border tensions. 
 
THE TAJIK-UZBEK BORDER 
In late December 2002, two more Tajik residents from the Isfara district of 
Tajikistan were killed along the heavily mined Tajik-Uzbek border. Since the 
Uzbeks began planting antipersonnel mines along the border (in response to the 
1999 invasion of the IMU), more than 70 civilians have been killed and dozens 
more have been wounded. Tajikistan repeatedly has protested, but Uzbek 
authorities have ignored the complaint in deference to claims of border security. 
(ITAR-TASS, 0644 GMT, 30 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1230, and MASHHAD 
VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 3 Jan 03; FBIS-NES-2003-0104, 
via World News Connection)  
 
TURKMEN-UZBEK TENSIONS 
The most recent tensions between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were related to 
the 25 November 2002 assassination attempt on Turkmen President Saparmurat 
Niyazov. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 4 Dec 02) In mid-December, the Turkmen 
National Security Ministry raided the residence of the Uzbek ambassador to 
Turkmenistan in a search for Boris Shikhmoradov, the former Turkmen deputy 
prime minister who was a suspect in the coup plot against Niyazov. While the 
Uzbeks did not respond by moving troops to strengthen the border, they did view 
the act as a violation of international law and diplomatic damage control ensued. 
Though tensions remain, both sides have rhetorically tried to diffuse the 
awkwardness of the situation. (INTERFAX, 1447 GMT, 20 Dec 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-1220, via World News Connection) 
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Issues of Reform 
In addition to the border threats endemic to the region, internal threats also have 
emerged. Roughly placed under the rubric of reform, political change (or at least 
the growing pains associated with the young republics) has been unavoidable. 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
In response to calls for his resignation and to appease a dissatisfied public 
increasingly active in opposition protests, (THE NIS OBSERVED, 22 May 02) 
Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev has scheduled a national referendum aimed at 
changing the constitution. The envisioned changes would: 1) replace the current 
bicameral parliament with a unicameral parliament in 2005; 2) merge the Court of 
Arbitration into the Supreme Court; and 3) allow for the establishment of political 
parties based on religious or ethnic principles. The new constitution also would 
increase state control over national education. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 15 Jan 03, 
and ITAR-TASS, 1107 GMT, 13 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-0113, via World News 
Connection) 
 
While the referendum approach to implementing political change is laudable, the 
outcome of the referendum likely is intended to increase Akaev's legitimacy for 
the remainder of his term. The Aksy riots and regular protests that ensued 
weakened his control over the state. Opposition figures have protested that there 
has not been enough time to review the proposed amendments properly, though 
Akaev has countered criticism by describing the constitutional changes as a 
compromise intended to appease the opposition. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 15 Jan 
03) 
 
JUDICIAL REFORM 
The Kazakh Conference for Democratization and Civil Society Development has 
maintained that the Kazakh constitution needs to be amended to obtain proper 
electoral representation. (INTERFAX, 1619 GMT, 10 Jan 03; FBIS-SOV-2003-
0111, via World News Connection) While the Kyrgyz referendum likely will 
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bolster such calls for constitutional reform in the region, the Kazakh Supreme 
Judicial Council has taken its own steps towards implementing change through 
the introduction of a jury system. Kairat Mami, chairman of the Kazakh Supreme 
Court, remarked that "judicial procedures involving juries will not only stimulate 
the principle of trial competitiveness but will also be a significant step towards 
democratizing the society and state." (INTERFAX, 1057 GMT, 23 Dec 02; FBIS-
SOV-2002-1223, via World News Connection) 
 
VIOLENT AND EXTRINSIC REFORM 
The Kyrgyz and Kazakh steps towards democratic reform are no doubt 
welcomed by the West. However, the recent assassination attempt against 
Niyazov was acknowledged by some as a welcome expression of a desire for 
reform. A report by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) argues 
that "there is no other way to achieve systematic change and stop the dangerous 
spiral of decline than for Niyazov, one way or another, to leave." (ICG, 17 Jan 03; 
via www.crisisweb.org) Extrinsic calls for the need to reform are seldom voiced 
so blatantly. 
 
Meanwhile, the October 2002 speech by British Ambassador to Uzbekistan Craig 
Murray still causes debate. In light of the West's increased economic support for 
Uzbekistan (due to its cooperation in the allied actions against Afghanistan), 
Ambassador Murray stated bluntly that "Uzbekistan is not a functioning 
democracy, nor does it appear to be moving in the direction of democracy." 
(EURASIANET, 14 Jan 03; via www.eurasianet.org) 
 
These concerns and internal urges for reform, coupled with the challenges that 
tensions along borders present, speak of a region having to negotiate a political 
and national identity in a mutual relationship with its neighbors who share a 
Soviet past yet are forging different futures. One hopes that the delimitation of 
boundaries as well as constitutional and judicial reforms will go far to improving 
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the lives of ordinary citizens perplexed by political actions that do not appear to 
benefit them. 
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